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 For centuries, the writ of habeas corpus has been used 
to test the legality of restraints on a person’s freedom. The 
Founders, recognizing the significance of the protection, in-
corporated the writ into the Suspension Clause of our Con-
stitution. In the last century, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that noncitizens may invoke the Suspension Clause. 
Courts, especially in the immigration context, also expanded 
the definition of “in custody” for the purpose of habeas cor-
pus to included non-detained persons in removal proceed-
ings. The Supreme Court has departed from such precedent 
and gave new meaning to habeas corpus in the immigration 
context—a major undertaking with serious consequences for 
asylum seekers. 
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 This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam. It fo-
cuses on the Court’s departure from precedent to project 
new meaning onto habeas corpus in the immigration context. 
In critiquing such departure, the Comment discusses the ero-
sion of asylum protections in the last twenty-five years. This 
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INTRODUCTION 
Asylum law in the United States derives from the International 
Refugee Convention and provides that any person “physically pre-
sent in the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . may 
apply for asylum” irrespective of the person’s status.1 Many foreign 
nationals cling to the hope that arriving in the United States will 
provide them with a safe haven from persecution, torture, and po-
tential death.2 But for most asylum seekers, making it to the United 
States marks the beginning of another tough battle against a relent-
less adversary: the United States immigration system.3 
United States immigration law has always been a complex and 
challenging system, but since 2017, the federal government has in-
creased its attacks on the asylum process.4 The Trump administra-
tion issued executive orders increasing the use of expedited re-
moval,5 raised the threshold for credible fear interviews,6 prolonged 
the detention of asylum seekers,7 eviscerated asylum seekers’ due 
 
 1 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2001). 
 2 Asylum Seekers and Refugees, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., https://im-
migrantjustice.org/issues/asylum-seekers-refugees (last updated Nov. 2020). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 6 Memorandum from the Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to the Acting 
Comm’r of U.S. Customs & Border Protection, et al. 8 (Feb. 20, 2017). 
 7 ICE launched the Family Case Management Program in 2017 to keep fam-
ilies seeking asylum together and out of detention. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-18-22, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT’S AWARD OF THE FAMILY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
CONTRACT 2 (2017). The Trump administration ended the program and reduced 
the number of asylum seekers released on humanitarian parole in violation of 
ICE’s policy directive requiring the agency to release asylum seekers who have a 
sponsor and pose no risk to the community. Jane C. Timm, This Obama-Era Pilot 
Program Kept Asylum-Seeking Migrant Families Together. Trump Canceled It., 
NBC NEWS (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/im-
migration-border-crisis/obama-era-pilot-program-kept-asylum-seeking-migrant-
families-together-n885896. 
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process rights,8 implemented a “zero-tolerance” policy,9 and en-
forced case quotas.10 In addition to these attacks, the administration 
also limited the availability of asylum for victims of domestic and 
gang violence,11 issued an interim final rule that banned asylum,12 
implemented “Remain in Mexico,”13 undermined the protections for 
unaccompanied children seeking asylum,14 doubled the wait time 
for asylum seekers to apply for employment authorization,15 and 
 
 8 In March of 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions vacated the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 
226 (A.G. 2018). The vacatur denies asylum seekers the right to testify on their 
own behalf before being denied asylum or deported. See id.; see also Matter of E-
F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 324 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 9 Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Off. of the Att’y Gen., to Federal Pros-
ecutors Along the Southwest Border 1 (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/press-release/file/1049751/download. 
 10 Joel Rose, Justice Department Rolls Out Quotas for Immigration Judges, 
NPR (Apr. 3, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/jus-
tice-department-rolls-out-quotas-for-immigration-judges. 
 11 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018). The Biden admin-
istration moved quickly to reverse former Attorney General Sessions’ vacatur of 
Matter of A-B-, concluding that rulemaking was the best way to consider the is-
sues involved. Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307, 309 (A.G. 2021); see also 
Matter of L-E-A, 28 I. & N. Dec. 304, 305 (A.G. 2021) (finding the definition of 
“particular social group” would also be best addressed by issuing a final rule). 
These decisions reflect the shifting nature of immigration law when left in the 
hands of the executive. See infra Part IV. 
 12 Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661, 57,663 (Nov. 15, 2018). 
 13 Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., to L. Francis Cissna, Dir. Of U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., et al. (Jan. 
25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_
migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf (requiring asylum seekers try-
ing to enter the U.S. from the southern border to wait in Mexico for court hear-
ings). 
 14 Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum Division, U.S. Citizen-
ship & Immigr. Servs., to All Asylum Office Staff (May 31, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/Memo_-_Updated_
Procedures_for_I-589s_Filed_by_UACs_5-31-2019.pdf. In August of 2019, the 
United States District Court of Maryland issued a temporary restraining order, 
enjoining USCIS from applying the memorandum. See generally J.O.P. v. U.S 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 409 F. Supp. 3d 367 (D. Md. 2019). 
 15 Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment Authorization for Appli-
cants, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,532, 38,533 (Aug. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 
208, 274). 
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increased fees for asylum seekers.16 Each of these actions was a part 
of the federal government’s systematic attack on asylum, seeking to 
erode asylum protections completely.17 
On June 25, 2020, the United States Supreme Court further 
eroded the asylum protections afforded to noncitizens by the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (“INA”).18 In Department of Homeland 
Security v. Thuraissigiam, the Court decided by a 7-2 vote that de-
nials of asylum claims in expedited removal proceedings are not re-
viewable under the writ of habeas corpus.19 This holding gave new 
meaning to habeas corpus relief in the immigration context and de-
parted from over 100 years of precedent.20 That departure, coupled 
with the court’s refusal to extend constitutional due process protec-
tions to asylum applicants, allows officers employed by the execu-
tive branch to make arbitrary asylum adjudications without any ac-
countability.21 This Article analyzes the Court’s opinion, the way it 
changed habeas corpus in the immigration context, and the conse-
quences this major undertaking will cause. 
Part I outlines the history of the writ of habeas corpus (“The 
Great Writ”) and its constitutional foundation. It discusses the rare 
instances where the government has suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus, emphasizing the extraordinary circumstances required to 
justify a suspension. The section also briefly discusses legislative 
limits to habeas corpus, specifically focusing on the circumstances 
 
 16 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service Fee Schedule and Changes to 
Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788, 
46,791 (Aug. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 106, 204, 211, 212, 214, 
216, 217, 223, 235, 236, 240, 244, 245). 
 17 Colby Itkowitz, Trump: Congress Needs to ‘Get Rid of the Whole Asylum 
System’, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2019, 4:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/trump-congress-needs-to-get-rid-of-the-whole-asylum-sys-
tem/2019/04/05/700eac1a-57a5-11e9-8ef3-fbd41a2ce4d5_story.html. 
 18 See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963–64 
(2020); see also infra notes 280–82. 
 19 See 140 S. Ct. at 1963–64. 
 20 See id. at 1993 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting the majority’s ap-
proach “flouts over a century of th[e] Court’s practice”); see also infra notes 274–
79. 
 21 See Gerald Neuman, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Habeas Corpus in 
DHS v. Thuraissigiam, JUST SEC. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/
72104/the-supreme-courts-attack-on-habeas-corpus-in-dhs-v-thuraissigiam/. 
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surrounding the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996. 
Part II discusses the facts, relevant law, and holding of Thurais-
sigiam. This section focuses on the decision’s separate opinions. It 
distinguishes between the justices’ distinct framings of Thuraissi-
giam’s claims. Only then does it become apparent how each framing 
impacts the Court’s reasoning. 
Part III addresses the Court’s departure from habeas corpus 
precedent in the immigration context, as well as the due process im-
plications of the Court’s decision. This Article concludes by ex-
plaining how denying habeas review of asylum denials in expedited 
removal proceedings erodes noncitizens’ right to asylum protection. 
It argues that unless the Supreme Court narrows or overturns 
Thuraissigiam, the current administration and Congress must act to 
rebuild the asylum system, including codifying noncitizens’ rights 
to habeas corpus review of asylum denials in expedited removal pro-
ceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Origins and History of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
As early as 1215, the Magna Carta embraced the concept that no 
person “shall be seized or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judg-
ment of his equals or by the law of the land.”22 However, it was not 
until 1600 that English courts began considering petitions for habeas 
corpus.23 In anticipation of his brother succeeding him to the throne, 
King Charles II’s Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 
fearing that King James II would violate English liberties.24 The Act 
guaranteed the privilege of habeas corpus petitions and outlined the 
petition’s requirements.25 It remains in effect in England today.26 
 
 22 Treasures in Full: Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBR. (Sept. 27, 2007, 3:20 PM), 
https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/academics/founders/MagnaCarta.pdf. 
 23 Habeas Corpus, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ha-
beas_corpus (last updated June 2017). 
 24 Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/writ-of-habeas-corpus.html#skip_menu 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2021). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 influenced the framers of the 
Constitution to incorporate the right of habeas corpus into the United 
States Constitution.27 Habeas corpus encompasses a variety of writs 
that seek to bring a person within a court’s power.28 The most well-
known writ is the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, also 
known as "The Great Writ.”29 The petition is used to determine 
whether a person imprisoned or detained is being lawfully held.30 
The right to habeas corpus is rooted in the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause31 and federal statutes.32 The Suspension Clause protects the 
right of the writ of habeas, preventing the federal government from 
suspending the right except in cases of rebellion, invasion, or where 
public safety requires it.33 The framers, remembering their struggles 
under an oppressive government, valued The Great Writ and de-
clared that it should be suspended only under extraordinary circum-
stances.34 
1. SUSPENSION OF THE GREAT WRIT THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
Since the Constitution’s ratification, the government has sus-
pended the writ of habeas corpus only three times prior to Thurais-
sigiam.35 The first time was during the Civil War when President 
Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ throughout the Union for 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Habeas Corpus, supra note 23. 
 29 Remarks on the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum, and the Practice 
Connected Therewith, 4 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 259–60 (1856) [hereinafter Remarks 
on the Writ of Habeas Corpus]; Ordan M. Steiker, Habeas Corpus: Origins and 
History, Constitutional Protection of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Scope of 
Federal Habeas Corpus (2021), https://law.jrank.org/pages/1312/Habeas-Cor-
pus.html. 
 30 Remarks on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 29, at 259–60. 
 31 “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 32 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 34 Amy Barrett & Neal K. Katyal, Common Interpretation: The Suspension 
Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitu-
tion/interpretation/article-i/clauses/763#:~:text=The%20Suspension%20
Clause%20protects%20liberty,the%20public%20safety%20requires%20it. 
 35 See id. 
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prisoners of war, spies, traitors, or soldiers.36 Lincoln’s decision 
spurred controversy about the president’s authority to imprison peo-
ple indefinitely without judicial review or authorization from Con-
gress.37 The debate centered on Lincoln’s authority to suspend the 
writ absent congressional authorization.38 Congress responded to 
those concerns on March 3, 1863, passing the Habeas Corpus Sus-
pension Act, which authorizes the president of the United States to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.39 
The other instances of suspension were more geographically 
limited.40 During Reconstruction, President Ulysses S. Grant sus-
pended the writ in nine South Carolinian counties with prevalent Ku 
Klux Klan (“KKK”) activity.41 He aimed to eliminate the KKK’s 
presence and stop KKK violence.42 Nearly seventy years later, rely-
ing on the Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900,43 the governor of Hawaii 
declared martial law and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the 
State.44 Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor constituted a serious threat 
to public safety, justifying the writ’s suspension.45 
 
 36 Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Sept. 24, 1862), in 6 COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 98–99 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1897). 
 37 Rufus E. Foster, The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 2 S.L.Q. 
269, 271–72 (1917) (explaining that Lincoln’s issuance of the proclamation sus-
pending the writ of habeas corpus in the entire United States was not met with 
unanimous approval of jurists). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 (1863) 
(“[D]uring the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in 
his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States”); Fos-
ter, supra note 37, at 271–72. 
 40 See Barrett & Katyal, supra note 34. 
 41 See Ulysses S. Grant, A Proclamation (Oct. 17, 1871), in COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, supra note 36, at 
136–38. 
 42 See id.; Barrett & Katyal, supra note 34. 
 43 “[T]he governor shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws 
of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii within the said Territory, and 
whenever it becomes necessary . . . he may, in case of rebellion or invasion, im-
minent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus.” Hawaiian Organic Act, Ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141, 
153 (1900). 
 44 See Barrett & Katyal, supra note 34. 
 45 See id. 
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These instances show that suspension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus must be justified by extraordinary circumstances that jeopardize 
public safety.46 The rigor of that standard demonstrates the writ’s 
importance in United States society and in protecting individual lib-
erties; however, in the last three decades, more recent threats to pub-
lic safety prompted Congress to further limit the writ’s availabil-
ity.47 
2. LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS: AEDPA 
On the morning of April 19, 1995, former soldier and security 
guard Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including sixteen 
children, and injuring hundreds more, while also destroying hun-
dreds of nearby buildings.48 One year later, Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).49 The 
Act purported “to deter terrorism” and “provide justice for victims” 
of terrorism.50 To achieve those purposes, Title I of AEDPA amends 
the federal habeas corpus statute to include a one-year statute of lim-
itations on the availability of habeas corpus relief.51 
B. The Great Writ in Immigration 
Although the writ of habeas corpus is most commonly used to 
challenge the legality of criminal convictions and sentences,52 it is 
also used in the immigration context to challenge the legality of 
 
 46 See id. 
 47 See infra notes 48–51. 
 48 Oklahoma City Bombing, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: HIST., https://
www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited Sept. 3, 
2021). 
 49 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104–
132, § 1, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (1996) (amended in 2016). 
 50 Id. at 1214. 
 51 “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 
§ 101, 110 Stat. at 1217. 
 52 Jurisdiction: Habeas Corpus, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/his-
tory/courts/jurisdiction-habeas-corpus. 
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detention and orders of deportation.53 A petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus is available to any person found to be in “custody.”54 A de-
tained noncitizen fits the “custody” requirement for the writ of ha-
beas corpus.55 But the meaning of “custody” is no longer limited to 
physical detention.56 Noncitizens filing habeas corpus petitions seek 
initial review of administrative decisions.57 In this context, no judi-
cial proceedings have occurred, and often, no other review of the 
decision is available.58 Habeas corpus in immigration underwent 
two major changes due to the passage of new legislation: the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”)59 and the REAL ID Act of 2005.60 
1. THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT 
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996 
In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA to improve the nation’s 
border control.61 Under IIRIRA, certain applicants seeking admis-
sion into the United States are subject to expedited removal.62 Ex-
pedited removal is a process designed to speed up immigration pro-
ceedings.63 The process grants low-level immigration officers 
 
 53 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS 2–4 (2008), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advi-
sory/lac_pa_0406.pdf [hereinafter AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO 
HABEAS CORPUS]. 
 54 Charles A. Cushman, The “Custody” Requirement for Habeas Corpus, 50 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1970). 
 55 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS, supra note 53, at 3–4. 
 56 In the absence of physical restraint, other restrictions on liberty may satisfy 
the custody requirement for habeas corpus purposes. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 
U.S. 426, 437 (2004) (“[the Court’s] understanding of custody has broadened to 
include restraints short of physical confinement”). 
 57 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 
53, at 2. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–610 (1996) (amending 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252). 
 60 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310–311 
(2005) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252). 
 61 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
110 Stat. at 3009-553. 
 62 Id. at 3009-580. 
 63 Id. at 3009-580–81. 
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authority to quickly deport certain noncitizens who are either undoc-
umented or have committed fraud or misrepresentation.64 Immigra-
tion officials have conducted expedited removal proceedings since 
2004, deporting many individuals entering without the proper doc-
umentation if apprehended within two weeks of their arrival and 
within 100 miles of the northern or southern borders.65 The use of 
expedited removal saw a dramatic increase under the Trump Admin-
istration.66 
On January 25, 2017, former President Donald Trump issued an 
executive order to improve border security and immigration en-
forcement.67 Two years later, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) announced that it would carry out the full expansion of ex-
pedited removal.68 This meant that, as of July 23, 2019, expedited 
removal was applicable to individuals without documentation, indi-
viduals who have committed fraud or misrepresentation, and indi-
viduals who have not been physically present in the country for at 
least two years prior to apprehension.69 The executive order greatly 
expanded the number of individuals subject to expedited removal.70 
When an immigration officer decides that a noncitizen is subject 
to expedited removal, the government places the noncitizen in re-
moval proceedings without allowing the noncitizen to secure an at-
torney or contest removal before a judge.71 Some noncitizens 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,881 
(Aug. 11, 2004). 
 66 See JOHN. F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 6 (2014), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2013.pdf; Erik Larson, 
Trump Gets Path Cleared for Expedited Removal of Immigrants, DET. NEWS 
(June 23, 2020, 2:04 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020
/06/23/trump-gets-path-cleared-expedited-removal-immigrants/112000884/. 
 67 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 68 See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. at 48,877; 
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1 (2019), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/primer
_on_expedited_removal.pdf [hereinafter AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL]. 
 69 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, A PRIMER ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL, supra note 68, 
at 1. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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subjected to expedited removal are entitled to procedural protections 
before the noncitizen can be removed from the United States.72 One 
way that a noncitizen can avoid expedited removal is through a 
showing of “credible fear of persecution” to an asylum officer.73 If 
the asylum officer finds that the noncitizen has a credible-fear claim, 
the noncitizen is placed in formal removal proceedings, allowing the 
noncitizen to pursue asylum protection.74 Even if the officer deter-
mines otherwise, the noncitizen maintains administrative review of 
the asylum claim before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).75 These pro-
cedural protections are intended to preserve the integrity of the asy-
lum process.76 
2. THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 
Before 2005, habeas corpus petitions in immigration fell under 
two categories: challenges to the legality of removal or challenges 
to detention.77 With the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Con-
gress sought to eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction over final orders 
of removal, deportation, and exclusion.78 The Act also consolidated 
habeas review in the courts of appeals.79 Nevertheless, habeas cor-
pus remains available to challenge the length and conditions of im-
migration detention.80 In the past two decades, the Supreme Court 
has consistently upheld the availability of habeas corpus to bring 
statutory and constitutional challenges to detention.81 
 
 72 See id. at 2. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 
53, at 2–4. 
 78 REAL ID Act of 2005 § 106 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252). 
 79 Id. 
 80 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 
53, at 2–4. 
 81 See e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688–89 (2001) (holding that 
habeas corpus may be used to challenge post-removal order detention and that the 
government cannot detain a removable noncitizen indefinitely); Demore v. Kim, 
538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (finding that a noncitizen may use habeas corpus to 
bring constitutional challenges to pre-removal order detention); Clark v. Martinez, 
543 U.S. 371, 386–87 (2005) (extending Zadvydas v. Davis to government deten-
tion of persons found to be inadmissible). 
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C. Recent Supreme Court Precedent 
Two Supreme Court decisions best exemplified the Court’s in-
terpretation of the Suspension Clause in the immigration context 
prior to Thuraissigiam: Boumediene v. Bush and INS v. St. Cyr.82 
The Court distinguished Thuraissigiam from Boumediene and St. 
Cyr, though the decisions represented the modern legal authority on 
the Suspension Clause as applied to noncitizens.83 An explanation 
of these decisions further emphasizes the Court’s departure from 
prior interpretations of habeas corpus and the Suspension Clause. 
1. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH 
In Boumediene, foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, sought writs of habeas corpus after being captured and desig-
nated “enemy combatants.”84 The Court first decided whether Sec-
tion 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”)85 denied 
federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions.86 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that if the statute denied juris-
diction and was valid, the Court had to dismiss the case.87 Kennedy 
found that the statute purported to preclude judicial review of habeas 
actions, defining habeas actions as cases “‘which relate to . . . deten-
tion.’”88 
After establishing that the statute deprived the federal courts of 
jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions, the Court then needed to 
determine whether “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay could 
invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause.89 The Government 
argued that “noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and de-
tained in territory located outside our Nation’s borders have no con-
stitutional rights and no privilege of habeas corpus.”90 The Court 
 
 82 See infra notes 84–118 and accompanying text. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008). 
 85 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2600 
(2006) (“[A]uthoriz[ing] trial by military commission for violations of the law of 
war . . . .”). 
 86 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 736. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 737 (quoting Habeas Corpus, Black’s Law Dictionary 728 (8th ed. 
2004)). 
 89 Id. at 739. 
 90 Id. 
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disagreed.91 Relying on the Framers’ intent and centuries of case 
law,92 the majority held that foreign nationals detained outside of 
the United States could invoke the procedural protections of habeas 
corpus.93 It established a test for determining when a petitioner may 
successfully invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause.94 The 
test is comprised of two parts: (1) whether a petitioner can invoke 
the Suspension Clause95 and (2) whether the statute in question lim-
its habeas review so far as to effectively suspend the writ as applied 
to the petitioner.96 The major takeaway from Boumediene is that the 
decision reaffirmed the court’s interpretation of the Suspension 
Clause in INS v. St. Cyr.97 
2. INS V. ST. CYR 
Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti and lawful permanent resident 
of the United States, pled guilty to selling a controlled substance in 
violation of Connecticut law.98 St. Cyr’s conviction made him de-
portable.99 At the time of St. Cyr’s conviction, he would have been 
eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportation by the Attorney 
General.100 The government did not initiate removal proceedings 
against St. Cyr until after the passage of both AEDPA and 
IIRIRA.101 Attorney General John Ashcroft argued that the two Acts 
 
 91 Id. at 748 (finding that common law evidence of writ’s geographic scope 
was informative but not dispositive as to whether noncitizens may invoke the 
privilege of habeas corpus abroad). 
 92 Id. at 739. 
 93 Id. at 797–98. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. at 732 (presenting the issue of whether noncitizens detained at 
Guantanamo have the constitutional privilege to invoke habeas corpus). 
 96 See id. at 736 (addressing whether MCA § 7 denies federal courts jurisdic-
tion to hear habeas corpus actions, and therefore, effectively suspends habeas cor-
pus actions as applied to the noncitizens detained at Guantanamo). 
 97 See infra notes 98–118. 
 98 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293 (2001). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 293–95 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 414, § 212, 
66 Stat. 163, 187 (1952)) (explaining that prior to the enactment of AEDPA and 
the IIRIA in 1996, § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was 
understood as granting the Attorney General the discretion to issue a waiver of 
deportation of resident noncitizens). 
 101 Id. at 293. 
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stripped him of the discretion to grant a waiver of deportation.102 In 
response, St. Cyr contended that the statutes’ restrictions on discre-
tionary relief from deportation do not apply to a noncitizen who was 
convicted of a deportable crime before the statutes’ enactment.103 
The Supreme Court agreed.104 
The majority held that discretionary waivers under INA Section 
212(c) remained available to noncitizens who obtained convictions 
through plea agreements and would have been eligible for such re-
lief at the time of their plea.105 Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, first addressed whether the Court had jurisdiction to review 
St. Cyr’s habeas petition after the passage of AEDPA and 
IIRIRA.106 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) ar-
gued that the Court did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 
2241107 to decide the legal issues in St. Cyr’s petition.108 To prevail 
on its claim, Stevens said, “[the INS] must overcome both the strong 
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and 
the longstanding rule requiring a clear and unambiguous statement 
of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”109 The major-
ity declined to interpret AEDPA and IIRIRA as stripping federal 
courts of habeas jurisdiction, finding that such an interpretation 
would raise serious constitutional issues under the Suspension 
Clause.110 
Next, the INS argued that AEDPA and IIRIRA repealed St. 
Cyr’s right to relief under former INA Section 212(c).111 Stevens 
said that for a statute to be applied retroactively, the statute’s lan-
guage must require that it be applied retroactively.112 The INS 
 
 102 Id. at 297. 
 103 Id. at 293. 
 104 Id. at 326. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 298. 
 107 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to grant or de-
cline writs of habeas corpus). 
 108 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298. The government’s position was that AEDPA and 
the IIRIRA’s amendments to the INA precluded the Supreme Court from deciding 
the questions of law in St. Cyr’s habeas corpus application. Id. at 293, 298. 
 109 Id. at 298. 
 110 Id. at 300. 
 111 Id. at 315. 
 112 Id. at 315–16 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
208 (1988)). 
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argued that Congress unambiguously communicated its intent to ap-
ply the provisions of IIRIRA’s Title III-A to all removals initiated 
after the statute’s effective date.113 The Court found that Congress’s 
intentions regarding the application of the “Cancellation of Re-
moval” procedure were ambiguous.114 The Court also concluded 
that interpreting the statute to apply retroactively would impose an 
impermissible effect on noncitizens who plead guilty to aggravated 
felonies, forfeiting the right to trial, in reliance on the possibility of 
Section 212(c) relief.115 Therefore, the Court held that St. Cyr was 
still entitled to relief under INA Section 212(c).116 
The Court’s decision in St. Cyr was consistent with its tendency 
to uphold and protect habeas review, even in the immigration con-
text. It was significant because it reinforced the critical point that 
“even in the narrowest interpretations, the writ of habeas corpus at 
common law . . . [did] not only apply to deportation proceedings or 
solely constitutional claims,” reflecting the writ’s broad scope.117 
This precedent further exemplifies the Court’s major undertaking in 
Thuraissigiam.118 
II. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY V. THURAISSIGIAM 
A. Background Facts 
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national, fled Sri 
Lanka in June of 2016 and headed for Mexico.119 United States Bor-
der Patrol stopped Thuraissigiam only twenty-five yards from the 
southern border on the United States’ side.120 Thuraissigiam entered 
without inspection (“EWI”) and did not have any of the necessary 
 
 113 Id. at 317. 
 114 Id. at 315. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 326. 
 117 Bernardo Villarreal Aguirre, Immigration and the Suspension of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus, 44 T. MARSHALL. L. REV. 117, 125 (2020). 
 118 See infra notes 274–79 and accompanying text. 
 119 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2020). 
 120 Id. 
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documentation to legally enter the country.121 When border patrol 
apprehended him, Thuraissigiam made a credible-fear claim.122 
Thuraissigiam is Tamil, an ethnic minority in Sri Lanka.123 It is 
well-documented that the Sri Lankan government routinely subjects 
Tamil people to human rights violations.124 Unfortunately, Thurais-
sigiam was a victim of such violations.125 In his credible-fear claim, 
he said he was afraid to return to Sri Lanka because while he was 
working as a farmer, “a group of men had once abducted and se-
verely beaten him.”126 The group was comprised of government of-
ficials.127 In addition to abducting and beating him, the government 
officials also subjected Thuraissigiam to simulated drowning and 
threatened to kill him.128 He fled Sri Lanka to escape further perse-
cution.129 
B. Procedural History 
An asylum officer conducted a credible-fear interview.130 The 
officer found that Thuraissigiam lacked credible fear of persecution 
based on one of the required protected grounds.131 According to the 
asylum officer’s record, Thuraissigiam told the asylum officer that 
he did not know who his abductors were or why they had beaten 
him.132 Thuraissigiam also told the asylum officer that he was not 
afraid of being harmed because of his political opinion.133 The of-
ficer ultimately determined that even though Thuraissigiam testified 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Department of Homeland Security v. Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, AM. 
C.L. UNION https://www.aclu.org/cases/department-homeland-security-v-vijaya
kumar-thuraissigiam (last updated June 25, 2020); see also Brief for Respondent 
on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., v. Thuraissigiam, 
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].  
 124 AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 123. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967. 
 127 AM. C.L. UNION, supra note 123. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id; see Brief for Respondent, supra note 123, at 5.  
 130 Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967–68. 
 131 Id. at 1968. 
 132 Id. at 1967. 
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credibly, there was no nexus between the persecution and one of the 
protected grounds.134 A supervising asylum officer agreed.135 
Following the asylum officers’ denial, Thuraissigiam requested 
de novo IJ review.136 On March 17, 2007, an IJ reviewed the asylum 
officer’s records and took testimony about Thuraissigiam’s back-
ground and his fear of returning to Sri Lanka.137 The IJ agreed that 
Thuraissigiam had not satisfied the nexus requirement for asy-
lum.138 Accordingly, the IJ affirmed the asylum officers’ decision 
and returned the case to the DHS for Thuraissigiam’s removal.139 
Thuraissigiam responded by filing a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of California, 
claiming that he feared being persecuted for his Tamil ethnicity and 
his political views.140 He also contended that his “‘expedited re-
moval order violated his statutory, regulatory and constitutional 
rights,’” seeking vacatur of the order in addition to a “‘new, mean-
ingful opportunity to apply for asylum and other relief from re-
moval.’”141 He specifically alleged that the asylum officer failed to 
“‘elicit all relevant and useful information bearing on whether the 
applicant has a credible fear of persecution or torture.’”142 The peti-
tion also included allegations that both the asylum officers and IJ 
applied an incorrect legal standard in making the credible-fear de-
termination, depriving Thuraissigiam “‘of a meaningful right to ap-
ply for asylum.’”143 The District Court for the Southern District of 
California dismissed the petition, finding the court lacked jurisdic-
tion under Section 1252(e)(2).144 
The district court held that Section 1252(e)(2) prohibited habeas 
review of Thuraissigiam’s claims because the provision limited 
 
 134 See id. at 1967–68. 
 135 Id. at 1968. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th 
Cir. 2019). 
 142 Id. at 1102 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)). 
 143 Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1102. 
 144 Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1082 
(S.D. Cal. 2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)). 
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review to three questions: (1) whether he was an alien; (2) whether 
he was “ordered removed under” Section 1225(b)(1); and (3) 
whether he had been previously admitted as a lawful permanent res-
ident, refugee, or asylee.145 The court then determined that these re-
strictions on habeas corpus review were constitutional.146 It found 
that the restrictions did not violate the Suspension Clause because 
Thuraissigiam was subject to a final order of removal under expe-
dited removal and Section 1252(e) “retains some avenues of judicial 
review” despite restricting habeas review.147 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.148 
While the Ninth Circuit agreed that 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(e)(2) 
precluded jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam’s claims, it disagreed 
with the district court’s holding that the provision does not violate 
the Suspension Clause as applied to Thuraissigiam.149 Judge 
Tashima, writing for a three-judge panel, applied the two-step 
Boumediene test.150 Thuraissigiam could invoke the Suspension 
Clause “[b]ecause in the finality era the Court permitted even arriv-
ing noncitizens to invoke habeas review.”151 The next step required 
the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Section 1252(e) limited ha-
beas review so far as to effectively suspend the writ as applied to 
Thuraissigiam.152 It again relied on the finality era to determine the 
requirements of the Suspension Clause when a removal order is 
challenged.153 Judge Tashima addressed the balance between ple-
nary power concerns and the protections of habeas corpus: 
[B]ecause §1252(e) prevents a court from reviewing 
claims of procedural error relating to a negative cred-
ible fear determination, it precludes review of the 
agency’s application of relevant law and thus raises 
 
 145 Id. at 1080. 
 146 Id. at 1083. 
 147 Id. at 1082 (quoting Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452, 456 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 148 Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1119. 
 149 Id. at 1100. 
 150 Id. at 1106. 
 151 Id. at 1115. 
 152 Id. at 1116. 
 153 Id. at 1119. “Finality era” refers to the period after the Immigration Act of 
1891—legislation making certain immigration decisions “final.” Dep’t of Home-
land Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1975–76 (2020). 
2021] WE'LL PROTECT YOU! OH, WAIT, BUT NOT YOU 329 
 
serious Suspension Clause questions. Plenary power 
concerns cannot in all circumstances overwhelm the 
“fundamental procedural protections of habeas cor-
pus . . . , a right of first importance.”154 
The Court of Appeals then declined to adhere to the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and interpreted Section 1252(e) to avoid 
the Suspension Clause issues, concluding that the statute could not 
be read to avoid the constitutional problems it created.155 
DHS filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme 
Court of the United States to answer whether Section 1252(e)(2), as 
applied to Thuraissigiam, violates the Suspension Clause.156 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held oral arguments on March 
2, 2020.157 Justice Alito, writing for a 7-2 majority, delivered the 
opinion of the Court.158 
C. The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion 
From the very beginning, Justice Alito’s opinion of the IIRIRA, 
specifically its provisions for expedited removal, was clear. He 
claimed that the United States “lives up to its ideals and its treaty 
obligations” by granting asylum to those with valid claims, which 
he described as “some” of the “many.”159 He used the same lan-
guage in reference to the number of fraudulent asylum claims.160 
The IIRIRA “crafted a system for weeding out patently meritless 
claims and expeditiously removing the [noncitizens] making such 
claims from the country.”161 In this way, the IIRIRA represented 
Congress’s judgment that such a system was necessary to avoid bur-
dening the immigration system with the task of detaining all asylum 
seekers until the removal process was completed or releasing the 
 
 154 Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 798 (2008)). 
 155 Id. 
 156 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., v. Thuraissi-
giam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161). 
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asylum seekers, presenting the risk that they would not appear for 
removal proceedings.162 
Alito conceded that most credible fear screenings, nearly sev-
enty-seven percent, resulted in a finding of credible fear.163 Then, 
he admitted that nearly half of the remainder of the total number of 
screenings, approximately eleven percent, were closed for adminis-
trative reasons.164 In some instances, the noncitizens withdrew their 
claims.165 These numbers suggest that, at a maximum, only eleven 
percent of credible fear screens resulted in expedited removal.166 He 
contended that according to these numbers, most asylum seekers 
who would be “subject to expedited removal do not receive expe-
dited removal.”167 Instead, they are afforded the same procedural 
rights as other noncitizens.168 Therefore, there is no reason to im-
pose the burden of detaining these individuals pending full removal 
proceedings on the immigration system.169 
Thuraissigiam relied on three bodies of case law to support his 
claim that Section 1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause.170 
Specifically, Thuraissigiam argued that the bodies of case law show 
that the Suspension Clause guarantees a broader habeas right, ex-
tending beyond a means to seek release from unlawful detention.171 
First, he pointed to British and American cases decided prior to and 
around the Constitution’s adoption to show that some noncitizens 
used habeas to remain in the country.172 Alito, however, argued that 
the relief granted in those cases was release from detention and not 
the ability to remain in the country.173 He contended that all these 
cases show is that habeas can be used to seek release from detention 
in a variety of different circumstances, emphasizing that “[t]he relief 
a habeas court may order and the collateral consequences of that 
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 163 Id. at 1966. 
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relief are two entirely different things.”174 Therefore, Alito con-
cluded that this body of case law did not support Thuraissigiam’s 
argument that the Suspension Clause guarantees a broader habeas 
right.175 
The second body of case law Thuraissigiam used to support his 
argument fared no better before the Court.176 Thuraissigiam relied 
on cases from the “finality era”177 to show “the Suspension Clause 
mandates a minimum level of judicial review to ensure that the Ex-
ecutive complies with the law in effectuating removal.”178 The ma-
jority disagreed with this interpretation of the holdings of the “final-
ity era” cases.179 Justice Alito said that those decisions were not 
based on the Suspension Clause.180 Instead, they were decided based 
on the habeas statute and the immigration laws of the time.181 At the 
time, the federal habeas statute was broad.182 It authorized federal 
courts to review whether a noncitizen was being held in custody in 
violation of immigration law.183 Therefore, when a noncitizen 
sought a writ of habeas corpus, federal courts had to consider 
whether based on the facts given by immigration authorities, deten-
tion was consistent with applicable immigration law.184 According 
to Alito, this authority was based on federal statute and not the Sus-
pension Clause.185 None of the “finality era” cases mention the Sus-
pension Clause as the basis for the Court’s authority.186 Conse-
quently, the majority found that the “finality era” cases offered no 
support for Thuraissigiam’s claim.187 
The final body of case law on which Thuraissigiam relied was 
Boumediene and St. Cyr.188 Alito dismissed Boumediene’s 
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relevance, claiming that the case was “not about immigration at 
all.”189 He distinguished the foreign nationals in Guantanamo Bay 
from Thuraissigiam because the foreign nationals in Guantanamo 
were not apprehended while crossing the border.190 Alito also noted 
that the foreign nationals in Boumediene were seeking release from 
detention and not permission to enter the United States.191 He fur-
ther emphasized that the Court’s decision did not mention, or even 
suggest, that the foreign nationals could have used habeas relief as 
a means of gaining entry.192 Because Thuraissigiam was seeking re-
view of an administrative decision and not release, the majority held 
that Boumediene did not support his Suspension Clause argu-
ment.193 
The majority found that St. Cyr did not help Thuraissigiam ei-
ther.194 The Court relied heavily on the statement that “because of 
[the Suspension] Clause, some ‘judicial intervention in deportation 
cases’ is unquestionably ‘required by the Constitution.’”195 Alito did 
not believe the statement did anything to support Thuraissigiam’s 
claim.196 The Court reasoned that the statement in St. Cyr did not 
signify a broader habeas right, allowing noncitizens to challenge 
negative asylum determinations, but instead reaffirmed that the writ 
can be invoked by noncitizens held in custody pending deportation 
proceedings.197 Finding that none of the three bodies of case law 
support Thuraissigiam’s claim, the Court held that Section 
1252(e)(2)’s limit on judicial review does not violate the Suspension 
Clause.198 
The Court then addressed Thuraissigiam’s claim that Section 
1252(e)(2) violates the Due Process Clause by precluding judicial 
review of his credible-fear proceeding.199 Alito criticized the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding, describing the notion that Thuraissigiam “‘had a 
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constitutional right to expedited removal proceedings that con-
formed to the dictates of due process’”200 as “contrary to more than 
a century of precedent.”201 He said that for foreign nationals who 
have neither obtained lawful admission nor acquired residence in the 
United States, the decisions of executive officers acting according 
to the powers given to them by Congress satisfy due process of 
law.202 Alito rejected Thuraissigiam’s argument that because he was 
not apprehended the instant he tried to enter the country, he should 
be afforded more rights.203 The Court concluded that a noncitizen 
who is apprehended and detained shortly after an unlawful entry 
cannot be said to have entered the United States, and accordingly, 
that Thuraissigiam’s only rights are those Congress provides to him 
by statute.204 Here, Thuraissigiam was entitled to a determination of 
whether he had “a significant possibility” of “establish[ing] eligibil-
ity for asylum.”205 The Court determined he was given that right, 
and because the Due Process Clause required no more, Thuraissi-
giam was not entitled to review of the determination.206 Thus, the 
majority concluded that Section 1252(e)(2)’s preclusion of judicial 
review of asylum determinations does not violate the Suspension 
Clause or the Due Process Clause.207 
D. The Concurring Opinions 
1. JUSTICE THOMAS 
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s holding that Thuraissi-
giam’s Suspension Clause argument was invalid because 
 
 200 Id. at 1981–82 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1111 n.15). 
 201 Id. at 1982. 
 202 Id. (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)); see also 
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Thuraissigiam was not seeking a writ of habeas corpus.208 The pur-
pose of his concurring opinion was “to address the original meaning 
of the Suspension Clause.”209 Thomas detailed the history of the writ 
of habeas corpus, beginning with the purpose of the writ in the 
King’s England.210 He focused on the language of the Suspension 
Clause and supposed the Clause protects a substantive right.211 He 
then asked what it means to “suspend” the writ.212 Thomas deter-
mined that a suspension is “not necessarily an express limitation on 
the availability of the writ of habeas corpus,” but rather “a grant of 
power to detain based on suspicion of a crime or dangerousness 
without bail or trial.”213 
According to Thomas, Section 1252(e)(2) did not invoke the 
Suspension Clause because an immigration officer’s determination 
of whether a noncitizen is inadmissible is based on more than mere 
suspicion or dangerousness.214 An immigration officer makes the 
inadmissibility determination based on the applicant’s failure to pro-
vide valid documentation and satisfy a two-year continuous physical 
presence requirement.215 Thomas concluded that the detainee’s lack 
of valid entry documents and the immigration officer’s finding that 
the detainee is not eligible for asylum requires the Executive power 
to have more than suspicion of a crime or dangerousness to detain a 
noncitizen.216 Thus, he claimed the “statute bears little resemblance 
to a suspension as that term was understood at the founding.”217 Ap-
plying this interpretation, Thomas concluded that 8 U.S.C. Section 
1252 does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.218 
2. JUSTICE BREYER 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also concurred with 
the Court’s holding that the statute’s limits on habeas corpus review 
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in expedited removal proceedings, as applied to Thuraissigiam, did 
not violate the Suspension Clause.219 First, Breyer pointed to the 
limited amount of time Thuraissigiam spent in the United States be-
fore border patrol apprehended him.220 He noted that Thuraissigiam 
was never lawfully admitted into the United States and never lived 
in the country.221 Using these facts, Breyer distinguished Thuraissi-
giam’s position as materially different than that of the noncitizens 
in prior cases for the purpose of the Suspension Clause.222 He con-
cluded that the scope of habeas review required by the Suspension 
Clause, given Thuraissigiam’s position, was not as extensive as the 
scope of habeas review for noncitizens who had either been admitted 
or lived in the United States for a period of time before being appre-
hended.223 
Second, Breyer was convinced that Supreme Court precedent 
demonstrates that the types of claims made by Thuraissigiam are the 
type that Congress may make unreviewable in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.224 Thuraissigiam relied on the “finality era” cases to sup-
port his argument for a constitutional minimum.225 Breyer argued 
that even accepting the argument that the “finality era” cases support 
a constitutional minimum, Thuraissigiam’s claims are substantially 
different than those reviewed in the “finality era.”226 He also said 
that even though Thuraissigiam’s claims were disguised as legal 
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questions, both claims are actually “challenges to factual find-
ings.”227 According to Breyer, at the core of both the purported legal 
challenges, there actually “lie[d] a disagreement with immigration 
officials’ findings about the two brute facts underlying their credi-
ble-fear determination.”228 These facts were the identity of Thurais-
sigiam’s attackers and the attackers’ motive.229 
Breyer treated Thuraissigiam’s country-conditions claim the 
same.230 He noted that Thuraissigiam did not point to evidence sug-
gesting the immigration officials purposely disregarded facts pre-
sented to them or otherwise known to them.231 Instead, Thuraissi-
giam argued that the credible-fear determination “was so egre-
giously wrong that immigration officials simply must not have 
known about conditions in Sri Lanka.”232 Because nothing in the 
administrative record indicated an incorrect application of the law, 
Breyer concluded the country conditions claim was also a factual 
challenge, stating that it “boils down to a factual argument that im-
migration officials should have known who respondents’ attackers 
were and why they attacked him.”233 Thuraissigiam conceded that 
he was not entitled to habeas review of the factual findings made by 
immigration officials during his credible-fear interview.234 Breyer 
then found that Thuraissigiam’s procedural claims were also unlike 
those reviewed in habeas proceedings during the finality era.235 As 
a result, neither Breyer nor Ginsburg believed Thuraissigiam’s po-
sition or habeas corpus precedent in immigration gave merit to his 
Suspension Clause challenge.236 
The two justices believed the holding should be limited to the 
facts of this particular case.237 Breyer argued that the Court should 
decline to go further in the future, as well.238 He said, “[a]ddressing 
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more broadly whether the Suspension Clause protects people chal-
lenging removal decisions may raise a host of difficult questions in 
the immigration context.”239 Consequently, according to Breyer and 
Ginsburg, the Court should avoid the difficult constitutional issue, 
as it had avoided the “serious and difficult constitutional issue” in 
St. Cyr nearly two decades prior.240 Thus, in their view, the Court 
should hold that Section 1252(e)(2)’s limits on habeas review does 
not violate the Suspension Clause based on the facts of Thuraissi-
giam’s case; however, the Court should not go further.241 
E. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice 
Kagan, criticized the majority for departing from years of habeas 
precedent and settled constitutional law.242 Unlike Breyer, So-
tomayor believed that Thuraissigiam’s claims were indistinguisha-
ble from those before the Court in previous cases involving noncit-
izens seeking habeas corpus review.243 She accused the Court of 
“skew[ing] the essence” of Thuraissigiam’s claims.244 Her framing 
of the claims differed significantly from that of Justice Alito and 
Justice Breyer in three important respects.245 
First, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with Justice Breyer’s conten-
tion that Thuraissigiam’s claims were challenges to factual determi-
nations disguised as legal questions.246 She believed the heart of 
Thuraissigiam’s claim was whether he was unlawfully denied ad-
mission under governing asylum statutes and regulations.247 This 
presented a legal question of whether the immigration officials in-
correctly applied the law in Thuraissigiam’s credible-fear proceed-
ings.248 Sotomayor found support for Thuraissigiam’s claim in the 
majority’s description of Thuraissigiam’s habeas petition.249 She 
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noted the Court’s observation that Thuraissigiam’s petition con-
tained factual allegations that pointed to documented persecution on 
the basis of his Tamil ethnicity and his political opinion.250 She ac-
cused the Court of refusing to admit that “its descriptions of 
[Thuraissigiam’s] arguments illustrate[d] . . . claims that immigra-
tion officials legally erred in their review of his asylum applica-
tion.”251 These descriptions undermined the Court’s assertion that 
Thuraissigiam’s claims had no merit beyond a mere plea to obtain 
authorization to remain in the United States.252 
Second, in addressing Thuraissigiam’s procedural claims, So-
tomayor said that the Court misconstrued Thuraissigiam’s proce-
dural challenges to the expedited removal proceedings.253 Accord-
ing to Sotomayor, this made a crucial difference in the Court’s anal-
ysis because “a constitutional challenge to executive detention is 
just the sort of claim the common law has long recognized as cog-
nizable in habeas.”254 On this point, Breyer, Ginsburg, and So-
tomayor agreed, differing only in that Breyer and Ginsburg claimed 
Thuraissigiam’s procedural challenges were not reviewable because 
the claims failed to allege sufficiently serious defects.255 Sotomayor 
noted that the other justices were entitled to their conclusion about 
the merits of Thuraissigiam’s procedural challenges but argued that 
those conclusions should not have foreclosed Thuraissigiam’s abil-
ity to bring the challenges in the first place.256 
Lastly, unlike the majority, Sotomayor and Kagan argued that 
Thuraissigiam’s request to be freed from wrongful executive cus-
tody was indistinguishable from prior cases where noncitizens chal-
lenged restraints that prevented them from entering or remaining in 
the United States.257 Sotomayor also emphasized that the Court had 
never designated “release” as the only remedy of a writ of habeas 
corpus.258 Regardless, she argued, Thuraissigiam requested habeas 
relief in “whatever form available and appropriate, including, but 
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not limited to, release.”259 Sotomayor cited Boumediene in support 
of her contention that release was only one form of habeas relief and 
St. Cyr for support that the writ of habeas corpus could be used to 
challenge erroneous applications or interpretations of the law.260 
She concluded that even accepting the Court’s improper framing of 
Thuraissigiam’s claims, the Court erred in determining that none of 
the Court’s precedents supported his claim that the Suspension 
Clause protected a habeas right to the type of relief that Thuraissi-
giam sought.261 
Sotomayor recognized that no common law habeas cases were 
perfect analogs for Thuraissigiam’s case.262 She argued that requir-
ing a perfect analog contradicted the Court’s longstanding approach 
to immigration cases.263 In so doing, she addressed the examples in 
English law, involving foreign nationals who were permitted to re-
main in England because of a release on habeas.264 Justice Alito and 
the majority disagreed that the foreign nationals’ ability to remain 
in the country was due to writs of habeas corpus ordering their re-
lease, arguing instead that their ability to remain was a consequence 
of “the existing state of the law.”265 However, Sotomayor countered 
that “[w]hat England’s immigration laws might have prescribed af-
ter the writ’s issuance did not bear on the availability of the writ as 
a means to remain in the country in the first instance.”266 She then 
proceeded to cite two more classes of cases that supported the avail-
ability of habeas corpus to noncitizens who wish to remain in the 
country.267 
Justice Sotomayor characterized the Court’s decision as an at-
tempt to alleviate policy concerns.268 She recognized that delays in 
asylum adjudications were undesirable, conceding that when asylum 
determinations are not timely, prolonged decision-making harms 
 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 1997. 
 261 Id. at 1997–99. 
 262 Id. at 1998. 
 263 Id. 
 264 See id. at 1999. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 2000. 
 268 Id. at 2013. 
340 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
 
those eligible for protection.269 However, she argued that Congress 
and the Executive were well-equipped to alleviate the strain on the 
asylum system.270 The role of the Judiciary is simply to ensure that 
the laws passed by Congress are consistent with the Constitution.271 
In Thuraissigiam, the Court failed to uphold its obligation.272 Con-
sequently, Sotomayor dissented, disagreeing with the Court’s inter-
pretation of the scope of The Great Writ and the reach of the Due 
Process Clause.273 
III. COMMENT ON THE THURAISSIGIAM DECISION 
A. Departure from Precedent 
The Court’s decision to exclude habeas review where an asylum 
seeker is denied asylum in expedited removal proceedings com-
pletely disregards centuries of governing precedent.274 Habeas relief 
extends as far back as the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 passed by 
British Parliament to prevent a King from unreasonably locking up 
his people.275 In modern times, habeas petitions are mostly used to 
review evidence of innocence after a criminal defendant has been 
convicted.276 And while legislation passed in 1996 and 2005 se-
verely limited The Great Writ,277 the Court has consistently upheld 
the protections of the Suspension Clause, ensuring the constitution-
ality of legislation.278 Therefore, the Court’s suspension of the writ 
of habeas review in the immigration context constitutes a major de-
parture from the writ’s history and purpose. 
 
 269 Id. at 2014. 
 270 Id. at 2014–15. 
 271 Id. at 2015. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See id. at 1993. 
 275 See supra notes 24–25. 
 276 Habeas Corpus, supra note 23. 
 277 See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. 
 278 See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 2015 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (stating 
that role of judiciary when faced with policy choices is “to ensure that laws passed 
by Congress are consistent with the limits of the Constitution”). 
2021] WE'LL PROTECT YOU! OH, WAIT, BUT NOT YOU 341 
 
The Court also departed from habeas precedent by limiting the 
writ of habeas corpus to only detained noncitizens.279 This limitation 
was a major undertaking, considering the Court’s previous assertion 
that its “understanding of custody has broadened to include re-
straints short of physical confinement . . . .”280 
B. Consequences for Asylum Seekers 
The Court’s decision in this case also denies due process protec-
tions to asylum seekers who have not yet been granted entry and 
wish to challenge asylum procedures.281 Due process protection is 
crucial to the asylum-seeking process because the procedures in 
place determine whether an applicant facing persecution in the ap-
plicant’s home country may seek refuge in the United States.282 The 
consequences of making a wrong determination are too severe to not 
allow for review.283 
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Expedited removal raises substantial questions of due process in 
itself.284 The authority of immigration officers to initiate expedited 
removal proceedings against a noncitizen is virtually unchecked.285 
As always, the burden of proof falls on the noncitizen to prove the 
noncitizen is not subject to expedited removal.286 Because the pro-
cess is so short, consisting only of an interview with an inspecting 
officer, there is often no opportunity for the noncitizen to speak with 
an attorney or gather evidence to prevent deportation.287 
In the asylum context, the expedited process raises additional 
concerns.288 Those seeking protection often experience trauma from 
either their travels to the United States or the harm they experienced 
in their home country.289 Trauma victims experience significant dif-
ficulty when trying to explain why they need protection and when 
recounting important details of certain events.290 Consequently, an 
asylum officer may issue a negative credible-fear determination due 
to an applicant’s failure to provide evidence.291 Applicants who fail 
to remember dates properly may even be accused of making a fraud-
ulent claim and denied asylum where credible fear exists.292 The 
Court in Thuraissigiam leaves such applicants without a means of 
judicial review, forcing them back to a home country where perse-
cution, torture, and often, death, await them.293 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The federal government has made numerous changes to the asy-
lum system in the last decade, eroding asylum protections to the 
point that asylum in the United States is nothing more than an illu-
sion.294 Both Congress and the Executive have enacted legisla-
tion,295 executive orders,296 and final rules that limit asylum protec-
tions.297 Now, with the Thuraissigiam decision, the Judiciary has no 
less blood on its hands. The Court failed to uphold its obligation to 
ensure that Congress and the Executive act consistent with the Con-
stitution.298 In failing to do so, the Court endangers the hundreds of 
noncitizens who approach our nation’s borders, seeking refuge.299 
Former President Donald Trump called the asylum system a 
scam, expressing his wish to eliminate the system completely.300 
But the only scam is that the United States claims to “live up to its 
ideals and its treaty obligations”301 while expeditiously removing 
noncitizens who are claiming fear of persecution, after arbitrary, un-
checked decisions by low-level asylum officials.302 Unless the Su-
preme Court reverses course and either narrows or overturns its 
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decision in Thuraissigiam,303 the current Biden administration304 
and Congress must act to restore asylum seekers’ right to habeas 
corpus review. The fate many noncitizens face upon return to their 
home countries after receiving denials of their asylum applications 
outweigh any potential burden on the immigration system.305 Fail-
ure to act will endanger the lives of asylum seekers306 and under-
mine the country’s adherence to its treaty obligations.307 Out of all 
the persecution, suffering, and challenges asylum seekers face, the 
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